From
Forward I page v of
"Bayesian Methods in the Search for MH370:
Uncertainty
is all pervasive—whether it relates to everyday personal choices
and actions, or as background to business and policy decisions, or
economic and climate predictions. In recent times, few things have
attracted as much attention as the uncertainty surrounding the final
whereabouts of MH370.
Yes,
indeed.
A
cadre (and a large cadre at that) of very qualified people have
tossed their hat in the uncertainty reduction ring - the SSWG, the
DSTG, CSIRO, to name a few. I will refer to this group as the SSI,
Search Strategy Insiders. The SSI has representatives from Boeing,
Inmarsat, and Thales. Who can claim to know more about the
performance characteristics of a 777 aircraft than Boeing? Who can
claim to know more about the Inmarsat system than Inmarsat? Who can
claim to know more about how the AES functions than Thales?
Additionally
the SSI has access to 20 previous flights of 9M-MRO. The data from
these 20 previous flights includes the ACARS data, so the SSI knows
exactly where the aircraft was located, the ground track of the
aircraft, and the fuel consumption relative to these 20 previous
flights. Data of this type has never been made available to anyone
but the SSI.
From
page 27 of "Bayesian Methods..." referring to the BTO
calibration/validation:
The
data used to construct the histogram and the empirical parameters
were obtained from logs of the 20 flights of 9M-MRO prior to the
accident flight.
From
page 30 of "Bayesian Methods..." referring to the
collection of BFO statistics:
Empirical
statistics of the residual measurement noise wBFOk
were determined using the previous 20 flights of 9M-MRO. Data points
corresponding to when the aircraft was climbing or descending were
excluded.
The
SSI also has access to the radar data, not simply graphics, which has
never been put in the public domain. It is fair to say that the SSI
has a great deal of information that allows them to test and to
refine their modeling. The rest of us have nothing but the Inmarsat
logs from the accident flight, so there is no way to validate our own
modeling. Still, the terminal locations derived by the SSI are
consistent with the terminal locations derived by the rest of us.
There is obviously no magic here.
So,
what is the take-away? My early conclusion is that the ensemble of
data associated with the accident flight is not sufficient to
determine a terminus, and so would conclude any other person
reasonably skilled in the background analytics. The data can only
broadly constrain the possible terminal locations. It cannot
constrain terminal locations sufficiently well to have a high degree
of confidence in the results of an under water search conducted in a
relatively small area.
The only things wrong are our expectations.
The only things wrong are our expectations.